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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports research, aimed at validating design 
knowledge (Timmer, 1999) for airtraffic management 
(ATM). The knowledge is applied to an ATM 
simulation to diagnose design problems, associated with 
controller planning horizons. The case-study is judged a 
success. The design knowledge is shown to be correctly 
operationalised, tested and generalised to an ATM 
simulation, more complex than that used to develop the 
knowledge. However, problems with application are 
reported. The validation is, thus, only partial. Solution 
of these problems constitutes a requirement for future 
research. More general problems of applying design 
knowledge from research are identified and discussed. 
Keywords 
Validation; design knowledge; diagnosis; planning 
horizon; air traffic management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive Ergonomics researchers have been criticised 
for not building on each other’s work. Newman (1994) 
claimed that only 30% of such work enhanced 
modelling techniques, solutions and design tools, as 
against 90% for Engineering more generally. Elsewhere, 
Long (1996) claimed that poor discipline progress 
resides partly in the failure of research to validate its 
design knowledge. This paper has two aims. The 
primary aim is to report a successful case-study, which 
attempts to validate diagnostic design knowledge, both 
substantive and methodological, as applied to air traffic 
management (ATM). The secondary aim is to identify 
general problems of applying design knowledge derived 
from research. 
Reconstructed Air Traffic Management 
ATM is here understood as the planning and control of 
air traffic. Operational ATM manages air traffic, for 
example, Manchester Ringway Control Centre in the 
UK. The Centre manages a terminal manoeuvring area, 
as configured by: 9 beacons; more than 2 airways; 1 
stack; and 2 exits. Its traffic is: departing; arriving; over 
flying; ‘low and slow’; and high-level bunching. The 
management involves track and vertical separation 
rules. Planning is supported by paper flight strips and 
controlling by radar. Dowell (1998) developed a 
simplified simulation of the Centre – termed 
‘reconstructed air traffic management’ (rATM). The 
sector was configured by: 5 beacons; 2 airways; and no 
stack. Its traffic did not include ‘low and slow’ aircraft. 
Track and vertical separation rules were also simplified. 
Traffic was typically limited to 8 aircraft and entry to 
the sector was staggered. There was a single controller, 
using the paper flight strips to plan and the radar to 
control. Dowell (1993) also developed a domain model, 
comprising airspace objects and aircraft objects, 
consisting of attributes having values. Transformation 
of these attribute values results in aircraft ‘safety’ and 
‘expedition’, which express performance as ‘task 
quality’. 
Diagnostic Design Knowledge 
Timmer (1999) has developed a Theory of Operator 
Planning Horizons (TOPH). The theory consists of a set 
of frameworks (domain; interactive worksystem 
(operator and devices); and performance), as proposed 
by Dowell (1998) and a method for diagnosing design 
problems, associated with operator planning horizons. 
Timmer applied TOPH to rATM, producing a set of 
models, corresponding to each of the frameworks and a 
set of design problem diagnoses. TOPH is the 
diagnostic design knowledge to be validated here. 
Design Knowledge Validation 
Following Long (1996), design knowledge validation 
comprises: conceptualisation; operationalisation; test; 
and generalisation. Conceptualisation requires the 
design knowledge to be made explicit and so to be 
communicable to others (researchers and practitioners). 
Operationalisation requires the design knowledge to be 
applied correctly and demonstrably. Test requires the 
design knowledge to be evaluated against its own aims 
or claims, that is, its fitness-for-purpose. Generalisation 
requires design knowledge to be applied successfully 
over a number of different instances (design scenarios) 
to establish its scope. Here, Timmer’s conceptualised 
TOPH is operationalised, tested, and generalised over 
an ATM simulation, more complex than rATM. 
Features of a Correct Operationalisation 
Following Stork, Middlemass and Long (1995), the 
features of a correct operationalisation of TOPH 
diagnostic design knowledge are taken to be: 1. 
Diagnosis completeness; 2. Diagnosis consistency; 3. 
Application of domain, worksystem and performance 
models; 4. Rationale for model application; 5. Features 
of diagnostic method, embodied in diagnosis. 
Case-study Success 
Following Middlemass, Stork and Long (1999), case-
studies of design knowledge can be successful or 
unsuccessful. In successful case-studies, the design 
scenario is considered to fall within the scope of the 
knowledge. In unsuccessful case-studies, the design 
scenario is not considered to fall within the scope of the 
design knowledge. Successful and unsuccessful case-
studies, thus, together establish the scope of the design 
knowledge. Design scenarios are considered to vary in: 
their definition, that is, how well they are specified; 
their complexity (that is, how simple or complicated 
they are); and their observability, that is, the access 
accorded the validators of the design knowledge. 
Case-study Scenario 
In the case-study, the TOPH diagnostic design 
knowledge (Timmer, 1999 – see earlier) was applied to 
an ATM simulation, which differed from rATM in a 
number of respects, termed ‘reconstructed validation air 
traffic management’ (rvATM) (for full details see 
Debernard and Crevits, 2000). rvATM simulates an en-
route sector in the region of Bordeaux, France. The 
sector is configured by: 21 beacons; multiple airways 
and multiple exits. The traffic is heavy, up to 40 aircraft 
in the sector at any one time and flight patterns are very 
varied, requiring changes of heading, rather than 
changes of speed or altitude. Aircraft entry to the sector 
was not staggered. Track and vertical separation rules 
were close to operational practice. There are two 
controllers – the planning controller, responsible for 
flight strips and the radar controller, responsible for the 
radar. The flight strips are electronic and are displayed. 
They can be grouped by the planning controller and 
offered to the radar controller as decision support. 
Aircraft headings can be changed by means either of the 
flight strips or of the radar. 
The validator, who applied the design knowledge, was 
trained in HCI and had considerable experience as an 
HCI researcher. She was familiar with the TOPH 
research, through seminars, given by Timmer, the 
developer of the theory. However, she had no detailed 
knowledge of the method or any experience in its 
application, prior to the validation study. The validator 
is the second author of this paper. The source, for the 
design knowledge to be validated, was Timmer (1999) –  
the most complete version of TOPH in print. 
The validation study was ‘managed’ by the first author 
of this paper. He had been involved with Timmer in the 
development of the design knowledge (Timmer and 
Long, 1996; and 2002). His role here was to check the 
correct operationalisation of the TOPH theory. Any 
difficulties, experienced by the validator, in applying 
the design knowledge, were referred to the case-study 
manager for clarification. The manager also monitored 
the diagnostic products (models; method application 
etc) for errors. These interventions were necessary to 
ensure the correct operationalisation of TOPH. 
However, these interventions count against the 
validation of the design knowledge, since they indicated 
it was not entirely fit-for-purpose, either because of 
problems of conceptualisation, of expression or of both, 
as concerns that knowledge. All difficulties, associated 
with case-study manager interventions, were 
documented as design problems with TOPH, along with 
any difficulties in application, experienced, but correctly 
resolved by the validator, in the absence of case-study 
manager interventions (see later). 
If rATM and rvATM are compared in terms of the 
design scenario dimensions (see earlier), they can be 
judged similar as concerns definition and observability. 
In both cases, the definition of the studies was the same, 
that is, to diagnose design problems, associated with 
operator planning horizons, using the TOPH diagnostic 
design knowledge. The two studies are equally 
observable, both developer/validators having video 
access to the controllers. However, rvATM is much 
more complex than rATM. rvATM has a more complex 
sector configuration (more beacons; more pathways; 
and more exits) and a more extensive and varied traffic 
profile (number of aircraft). Traffic entry to the sector 
was not staggered, and vertical and separation rules 
were close to operational practices. The flight strips are 
electronic, with greater functionality. There are two 
controllers, who share management and who 
communicate verbally, as well as via the devices. 
Although the same in definition and observability, the 
rvATM design scenario differs from that of rATM, in 
that it is more complex. This difference is as required by 
the generalisation process of design knowledge 
validation – see earlier. A successful case-study would, 
thus, extend the scope of the TOPH diagnostic design 
knowledge to a more complex design scenario. 
DESIGN KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION AND 
EVALUATION 
An observational study was conducted, using four video 
cameras, in which the design knowledge validator 
recorded a rvATM simulation session. Four videos were 
made, recording both planning and radar displays and 
their associated controllers. The latters’ verbal 
communications were also recorded. In addition, the 
validator made notes; but did not otherwise intervene. 
The simulation comprised a full rvATM design scenario 
(as described earlier). Although not professional 
controllers, the two controllers were well versed and 
practised in ATM and on the sector simulated. They had 
acted as controllers in numerous, earlier observational 
and system development studies. 
The validator later observed the simulation videos and 
produced a  protocol of the synthesised data and also 
constructed a table of controller interventions, to aid 
interpretation of the data. Ambiguities in controller 
behaviours or intentions were identified, discussed and 
resolved with the controllers, as required. The protocol 
data are not shown here due to space limitations. 
Examples of controllers’ interventions are shown in 
Table 1. 
IBE712 at ENSAC change heading VELIN not BDX 
AFR543 at LMG change heading via FOUCO 
(Believes conflict btw IBE539 and MON904 there isn't) 
IBE550 heading change to 39 
SAW105 change heading 
Worried about conflict between KLM051 and N7225U 
Plan change KLM051 after AFR543 
KLM051 turn right 
IBE712 change heading direct TERNI 
KLM051 gone left not right has to change again (bug in 
the system) 
N7225U change heading Direct BTZ 
Plan want PAAA11 to go behind SAW105 
KLM358 change heading direct TERNI 
PLAN MUST NOT FORGET IBE550 (Iberia for TERNI) 
SAW105 change heading direct PEROT 
SAB6338 transfer to next sector 
PAAA111 change heading to the left 
IBE615 transfer to the next sector 
N7225U change heading direct to LESGA 
FUKCH change heading 
IBE550 change heading direct to POI 
Table 1 Table of  controller interventions 
Table 1 includes the aircraft traversing the sector, for 
example, IBE550 and KLM358. Also, shown are the 
beacons, over which the aircraft pass, for example, 
‘POI’ (Poitiers) and BDX (Bordeaux). Controller plans 
are identified, for example, ‘Plan change KLM051 after 
AFR543. Controller’s references to plans are also 
recorded, for example, ‘Plan must not forget IBE550’. 
Last, the validator’s comments are shown, for example, 
‘Believes there is a conflict between IBE539 and 
MON904 – there isn’t’. 
The protocol data along with the table of interventions 
include all the information, expected to be required to 
construct (for, example, all the TOPH models) and to 
apply (by means of the diagnosis method), the 
diagnostic design knowledge.  
Before the TOPH diagnosis method can be applied to 
diagnose design problems, associated with operator 
planning horizons, an integrated model for rvATM 
needs to be constructed. The integrated model includes 
models, corresponding to all the TOPH frameworks, 
identified earlier and derived by means of the TOPH 
theory from the protocol data and the table of controller 
interventions. Table 2 shows extracts from the rvATM 
integrated model for aircraft IBE550. It integrates work 
system-related models (Columns 1-5) with domain 
related-models (Columns 6 and 7). 
Column 1 shows a model of the goals of the rvATM 
worksystem (that is, controllers (planning and radar) 
and devices (flight progress strips (FPSs) and radar)) 
For example: ‘(A) Intervention IBE550 heading 39 at 
ENSAC’, that is, change aircraft IBE550’s heading to 
39. Letters denote different worksystem goals (and so 
tasks) and numbers denote the sequence of sub-tasks 
(and so sub-goals). 
Column 2 shows a model of the controllers’ behaviours. 
The model is expressed in terms of the TOPH operator 
architecture, which comprises physical architecture (for 
example, ‘head’ and ‘hands’) and mental architecture 
(for example, ‘working memory’, long-term memory, 
and goal store’). The architecture also includes ‘process 
structures’ (for example, ‘search for’ and ‘form goal’) 
and ‘representation structures’ (for example, categories 
of aircraft – ‘active’, ‘expeditious’ and goals – 
‘establish’, ‘amend’, and ‘intervene’). Behaviours occur 
when process structures are activated in conjunction 
with representation structures (for example, the physical 
behaviour – ‘search for (aircraft) and the mental 
behaviour ‘encode’ (aircraft category)). Physical 
behaviours can be observed on the video recording, for 
example, a controller head movement towards the radar, 
indicating a ‘search for’ (aircraft) behaviour. Mental 
behaviours are inferred, for example, ‘form goal’. 
Applying this architecture to the protocol data and the 
table of controller interventions identifies the controller 
behaviours, intended to achieve the worksystem goals 
of Column 1, for example, ‘HIGHLIGHT IBE550) FPS; 
PULLDOWN: change heading; SELECT: 39; 
CATEGORISE: IBE550; POPGOAL: (B). 
Column 3 shows a model of the controllers’ 
representation of the domain of rvATM. The model 
derives from the TOPH framework of mental categories 
for the aircraft being managed, applied to the protocol 
data and the  table of controller interventions. 
Categories include: ‘incoming/ active’; ‘safe/ unsafe’; 
‘expeditious/ unexpeditious’; etc. Categories in turn 
derive from  domain attribute values, such as aircraft: 
radar position; altitude; speed; heading etc. Examples 
from Column 3 are: ‘IBE550 (from) active safe 
expeditious to active safe unexpeditious (heading) 
aircraft’. The controller’s representation of the domain 
may be true or false. For example, here, the 
representation is true. 
Column 4 shows a model of the controllers’ 
representation of the devices. The main rvATM devices 
are the FPSs (electronic, that is, displayed) and the 
radar. For, example, ‘IBE550 FPS, Heading 39’. The 
controller’s representation of the domain may be true or 
false. Here, if the controller’s representation of the FPS 
is 45, then the representation is false.   
 Worksystem 
goals 
Controller behaviour Controller rep 
(domain) 
Controller 
rep devices 
Device 
behaviour 
Product goal Aircraft 
transformation 
(A) Intervention 
IBE550 Heading 39 
at ENSAC 
 
 
 
Planning/Execution 
HIGHLIGHT: IBE550 
FPS 
PULLDOWN: change 
heading 
SELECT: 39 
CATEGORISE: IBE550 
POP GOAL: (B) 
IBE550, heading 45 
changing 
IBE550, (from) active 
safe expeditious to 
active safe 
unexpeditious 
(heading) aircraft 
IBE550 FPS 
selected 
IBE550 FPS, 
heading 39 
IBE550 FPS 
highlighted 
IBE550 FPS 
heading 39 
Radar BTZ, 
IBE550, heading 
39 
 
 
 
IBE550 Progress 
worse 
Fuel use worse 
Safety same 
Exit worse 
7 minutes later        
(C1) Establish 
future intervention 
IBE550 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning/Execution 
SEARCH FOR: IBE550 
radar/SAU 
ENCODE/CAT: IBE550 
SEARCH FOR: KLM358 
radar/SAU 
ENCODE/CAT: KLM358 
PROBLEM SOLVE: 
IBE550 
IBE550 Position SAU 
IBE550 Altitude: 310 
IBE550 Heading: 39 
KLM358 Position LFBA 
KLM358 Altitude 310 
KLM358 Heading: Terni 
** Give IBE550 heading 
TERNI when KLM358 has 
passed 
FORM GOAL: (P5) 
Intervention IBE550 
heading TERNI when 
KLM358 has passed 
SUSPEND GOAL: (P5) 
POP GOAL: (C1) 
IBE550 Position SAU 
IBE550 Altitude: 310 
IBE550 Heading: 39 
KLM358 Position 
LFBA 
KLM358 Altitude 
310 
KLM358 Heading: 
TERNI 
    
3 minutes later       
(F) Establish future 
safety of IBE550 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monitoring 
SEARCH FOR: IBE550 
radar/VELIN 
ENCODE/CAT: IBE550 
SEARCH FOR: KLM358 
radar/VELIN 
ENCODE/CAT: KLM358 
 
PLAN DECAY (P5) 
POP GOAL: (F) 
FORM GOAL: (F1) 
Intervention IBE550 
heading POITIERS  
IBE550 Position 
VELIN 
IBE550 Altitude: 310 
IBE550 Heading: 39 
KLM358 Position 
LFBE 
KLM358 Altitude 
310 
KLM358 Heading: 
TERNI 
 
 
  
 
 
  
(F1) Intervention, 
IBE550 Heading 
Poitiers 
 
 
 
Planning/Execution 
HIGHLIGHT: IBE550 
FPS 
PULLDOWN: change 
heading 
SELECT: POI 
CATEGORISE: IBE550 
POP GOAL: (F1) 
IBE550, heading 39 
changing 
IBE550, (from) active 
safe unexpeditious to 
active safe 
expeditious (heading) 
aircraft 
 
 
IBE550 FPS 
selected 
IBE550 FPS, 
Heading POI 
IBE550 FPS 
highlighted 
IBE550 FPS 
Heading POI 
Radar Velin, 
IBE550, 
Heading POI 
 
(F) 
Intervention 
Improve QPM 
for IBE550 
event vector 
IBE550 Progress 
better 
Fuel Use better 
Safety same 
Exit better 
 
Table 2 Extracts from rvATM Integrated Model for aircraft IBE550 
Column 5 shows a model of the rvATM device 
behaviours, with which the controller’s behaviours 
(Column 2) interact. A comparison between Column 2 
and Column 5, that is, the interaction between the 
controller’s behaviours and the device behaviours, 
indicates their appropriateness for achieving the 
worksystem goals (Column 1). For example, ‘SELECT 
39’ behaviour by the controller, interacting with 
‘IBE550 FPS heading 39’ behaviour is appropriate for 
the ‘(A) Intervention IBE550 heading 39 at ENSAC’. 
Column 5 completes the models, related to the 
worksystem. Columns 6 and 7 relate to the domain. 
Column 6 shows a model of the product goal 
achievement, which expresses the effect of an 
intervention on the state of the associated aircraft. The 
product goal achievement relates to the worksystem’s 
goals, which appear in Column 1. For example, the 
worksystem goal ‘F1’ of ‘Intervention IBE550 heading 
Poitiers’ (Column 1), associated with the controller’s 
behaviour of ‘PULLDOWN: change heading’ (Column 
2), reflects the controller’s representation of the domain, 
‘IBE550 heading 39’ (Column 3) and the devices, 
‘IBE550 FPS, heading POI’ (Column 4) and achieves 
the product goal, ‘Intervention improves QPM (Quality 
Progress Management’ (Column 5). QPM refers to 
progress through the sector and fuel use.  
Column 7 shows a model of data from the domain 
framework about the state of each aircraft, 
corresponding to the TOPH performance framework. 
The two highest level states are ‘safe’ (for example, not 
in conflict with other aircraft) and ‘expeditious’ (for 
example, moving through the sector in a timely 
manner). In the case of IBE550, Intervention F1 
(Column 1), changing its heading to beacon Poitiers, in 
turn transforms its perceived state from ‘active, safe, 
unexpeditious’ to ‘active, safe, expeditious’ (Column 3) 
and its aircraft transformation to ‘Fuel use better; safety 
same; exit better’. 
This completes a description of the integrated rvATM 
model of worksystem and domain. The model is a pre-
requisite for applying the TOPH diagnostic design 
knowledge to rvATM and so to its validation. 
Before the TOPH diagnosis method can be applied to 
diagnose rvATM design problems, associated with 
operator planning horizons, there is a need to construct 
the controller’s planning horizons. The latter are derived 
from the rvATM integrated model (Table 2). 
Following TOPH, controller tasks can be divided into 
those of: administration; (for example, updating the 
FPSs); monitoring (for example, checking whether two 
planes are in conflict); and planning/execution (for 
example, specifying a future intervention, which is to be 
carried out) (see Table 2, Column 1). Planning horizons 
can be constructed only for planning/execution tasks. A 
plan is a mental representation structure, associated with 
mental process structures (for example, ‘form’; 
‘discard’; ‘decay’ etc), giving rise to planning 
behaviours. Plans can have three different outcomes: 
‘plan and decay’ (that is, plan with unintended non-
execution); ‘plan and discard’ (that is, plan with 
intended non-execution); and ‘plan and execute’ (that is, 
plan with intended execution). Planning horizons are 
constructed on the basis of information, associated with: 
the controller; the devices; the plan; its extension (over 
time) and its adequacy (to achieve worksystem’s goals). 
The data required to construct the planning horizon are 
extracted from the protocol data and the integrated 
model (Table 2). The rvATM planning horizon for 
aircraft IBE550 (see Tables 1 and 2) is shown in Table 
3. 
Encode      Intervention  Category     Plan/Execution 
FPS  Incoming 
aircraft 
 
Radar trace  Active aircraft  
Heading 45 
Altitude 
310 
 Active safe  
expeditious 
aircraft 
Change 
heading 39 
at ENSAC 
Position 
Ensac 
IBE550  
Heading 
change 39 
Active safe 
aircraft 
unexpeditious 
(heading) 
Leave 
IBE550 
Position 
SAU 
Alt 310 
Heading 39 
 
 Active safe 
unexpeditious 
(heading) 
  Lapse Lapse 
Position 
Velin 
Alt 310 
Heading 39 
 
IBE550  
Heading 
change 
POI 
Active safe 
expeditious 
(heading) 
Change 
heading to 
POI 
  Active aircraft 
exit 
 
Table 3 Planning horizon for aircraft IBE550 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the controller’s encoding of 
IBE550, for example, ‘Heading 45 altitude 310’ and 
‘Position ENSAC’. Column 2 shows the controller’s 
interventions, for example, ‘IBE550 Heading change 
POI’ (Poitiers). Column 3 shows the aircraft category, 
for example, IBE550, as ‘Active, safe, aircraft, 
unexpeditious heading’. Column 4 shows the 
plan/execution, for example, ‘Give Heading TERNI 
after KLM358 has passed’ – a plan and ‘change heading 
to POI’ (Poitiers) – an execution. 
A plan’s ‘extension’ expresses its projection into  future 
time. In the case of IBE550 from ‘Give heading TERNI, 
after KLM358 passed’ to ‘Change heading to POI 
(Poitiers) (Column 4, Table 4). The extension can also 
be identified in terms of the controller’s behaviours 
(Column 2) and representations of the domain (Column 
3) – both in Table 2. A plan’s adequacy expresses the 
quality of work, that is effected by the worksystem, if 
the plan is executed, that is, in terms of ‘safe’ and 
‘expeditious’ aircraft. In the case of IBE550, it is a ‘Safe 
unexpeditious (heading) aircraft’, when the plan is 
formed, which would have resulted in a ‘safe 
expeditious (heading) aircraft’, had the plan been 
carried out. Thus, the plan was adequate. However, the 
plan was not executed. It was either forgotten or 
discarded. Effectiveness expresses the adequacy of a 
plan’s extension. Here, the controller’s plan for IBE550 
was effective, when formed. According to TOPH, 
controller (resource) costs (that is, mental workload) are 
incurred, if plans are formed, but not executed. The 
controller costs, associated with the IBE550 plan of 
‘Give Heading TERNI after KLM358 passed’ serve no 
purpose (in the event, the plan is either forgotten or 
discarded, the aircraft being changed to POI (Poitiers) 
and not TERNI) and so are wasted.  
Given the rvATM protocol data and the integrated 
model (Table 2) and the planning horizon (Table 3), it is 
now possible to proceed with the application of the 
diagnosis method. The latter comprises four stages: 1. 
Identify problem; 2. Analyse planning horizon; 3. 
Extract required data from the integrated model; and 4. 
Generate causal theory. A design problem is considered 
to exist, when actual and desired performance differ, for 
example, if aircraft safety is violated or if aircraft 
expedition is too low (see Table 2, Column 5). The 
planning horizon provides an overview of the design 
problem and analysis thereof supports identification of 
whether planning is involved or not. For example, 
safety violation may have been rectified, or an adequate 
plan may have been formed, but have decayed in 
memory; re-planning may have taken place; or no plan 
may have been constructed. The planning horizon 
identifies relevant information from the integrated 
model to support causal theory generation. Such 
information may include particular behaviours and 
patterns of involvement of mental structures, both 
representation and process. Causal theory generation 
identifies the reasons for the design problem, as it 
relates to planning, for example, involvement of the 
mental structures and behaviours of the controller the 
forgetting of a plan or the failure to update the FPSs) or 
the structures and behaviours of the worksystem devices 
(,aircraft display on the radar and flight plan display on 
the FPSs). The causal theory would be expected to 
suggest possible design solutions to the design problems 
or to provide the basis for reasoning about such 
problems and solutions. 
In the case of rvATM: 
Problem Identification: An intervention with aircraft 
IBE550 has produced poor quality of work (the 
performance parameters for progress, fuel use and exit 
have become worse – see Table 2,  integrated model, 
Column 7). 
Analysis of Planning Horizon: Consultation of the 
planning horizon for IBE550 and establishing, that the 
problem arose, due to an intervention changing its 
heading to 39 (the aircraft was predicted to be unsafe). 
The planning horizon shows that the controller later 
made a plan to rectify this problem by changing IBE550 
to a different heading. This plan decays (or is 
discarded). However, another plan is formed to rectify 
the situation and is executed to produce better quality 
for progress, fuel use and exit values. 
Data extraction from Integrated Model: ‘IBE550 
heading change 39. IBE550 from active safe expeditious 
aircraft to active safe unexpeditious (heading) aircraft’.  
‘Problem solve IBE550. Give IBE550 Heading TERNI 
when KLM358 has passed’. 
‘Intervention IBE550 heading POI’ (Poitiers). 
Causal Theory Generation: The first intervention with 
IBE550, changing heading to 39, is carried out in 
response to a predicted conflict with KLM358, at a later 
time. This new IBE550 heading affects the performance 
of the aircraft with regards to progress and fuel use, as 
the aircraft is changed to a heading that takes the aircraft 
on a longer route, than that originally specified by the 
FPS. The controller knows, that at some stage in the 
scenario, he must change the heading of IBE550 back to 
its original airway, as IBE550 must exit at the beacon 
specified by the FPS. Later in the integrated model, the 
controller changes the heading of KLM358, which 
reminds him that IBE550 is not on its specified heading, 
and that he must change the heading back to that on the 
FPS, so that IBE550 will leave the sector at the correct 
exit beacon, once aircraft KLM358 is safely passed.  
The controller states that he will send IBE550 to TERNI 
at this time. TERNI is the last beacon on IBE550’s 
original airway. However, when the controller realises 
that KLM358 has now passed and decides to carry out 
an intervention on IBE550 to put it back on its airway, 
and thus to increase its performance, he decides to send 
it to POI. When the controller makes the heading 
change he has obviously forgotten that his original plan 
was to send IBE550 to TERNI.  POI is the last beacon 
specified on the FPS of IBE550. Looking at the FPS for 
IBE550 has prompted the controller to send IBE550 to 
POI. The original plan to send IBE550 to TERNI was 
made when the controller was looking at the radar.  The 
aircraft information shown on the radar does not display 
the exit beacons. The intervention to send IBE550 to 
POI, will improve performance: fuel use better, progress 
better and exit better. To solve this design problem the 
controller would have to take more account of aircraft 
progress and fuel use, when planning interventions. At 
this time, what is of primary import to the controllers is 
safety and little notice is taken of other parameters.  
Information on an aircraft’s fuel use could be displayed 
and a prompt issued to controllers to remind them of 
such reductions in performance. The prompt might be to  
direct the controllers to return an aircraft to its original 
airway more quickly, thus enabling performance 
parameters to become as desired. 
Diagnosis Evaluation 
The rvATM diagnosis is evaluated here analytically. 
First, the diagnosis is considered to be of the rvATM 
system (see earlier), as supported by the controller 
interventions, observed by video and shown in Table 1 
(and elsewhere, in the protocol data). Second, the 
diagnoses is of a rvATM design problem, as identified 
by Column 7 of Table 2, specifically and the table more 
generally. Last, the diagnosis relates to planning, as 
supported by the planning horizon (Table 3) and the 
causal theory, developed on the basis of the integrated 
model and the planning horizon. The rvATM diagnosis 
is, thus, considered to meet the requirements of being a 
design problem, associated with controller planning. 
Correct Operationalisation of the Design Knowledge 
The TOPH design knowledge is judged to be correctly 
operationalised, according to the requirements, set out 
earlier. First, the diagnosis is complete, inasmuch as it 
corresponds to the complete application of the diagnosis 
method, that is, the four stages. Second, the diagnosis is 
consistent with the planning horizon (Table 3), which is 
in turn consistent with the integrated model (Table 2), 
which is in turn consistent with the controller’s 
interventions (Table 1) and the protocol data. Third, the 
domain, worksystem and performance models of the 
integrated model (Table 2) are applied to the planning 
horizon construction and to the diagnosis formulation. 
Fourth, the rationale for the application of the models 
has been selectively exposed. Last, features of the 
diagnostic method are embodied in the diagnosis, for 
example, plan extension and adequacy. Last, the case-
study manager, familiar with TOPH, checked its 
operationalisation for correctness. 
Design Knowledge Validation 
The application of the TOPH diagnostic design 
knowledge is considered to meet the validation 
requirements, set out earlier. First, the design 
knowledge was operationalised, that is, the already 
conceptualised design knowledge was applied in the 
case-study to an ATM simulation, rvATM, more 
complex than rATM. Second, the knowledge was 
tested, in that it resulted in the identification of design 
problems, associated with operator planning. The test, 
however, also identified difficulties in the application of 
the knowledge, experienced by the validator, which 
must count against the validation. The latter can, then, 
be considered only partial. Some examples of the 
difficulties are shown in Table 4. Last, TOPH was 
generalised over rvATM, a more complex simulation 
than rATM (see earlier). One might be tempted to claim 
that TOPH is sufficiently scaled up to accommodate 
rvATM. However, in the absence of well specified 
relations between ATM, rATM and rvATM, it is 
perhaps safer to claim that TOPH has been ‘scaled 
across’ from rATM to rvATM.  
Case-study Success 
The case-study is considered a success, in the terms set 
out earlier. That is, rvATM, more complex; but equally 
well-defined and observable as rATM, is judged to fall 
within the scope of TOPH diagnostic design knowledge. 
Although the case-study is successful, the validation of 
TOPH is only partial, because of the validator’s 
difficulties in its application (Table 4).  
From 
Page 
From 
section/ 
paragraph 
Diagnosis of problem Solution to problem Comments speculations 
85 6.3.1.1.2 
3rd 
paragraph 
In rATM Operator physical 
behaviour hand movements 
correspond to radar (highlight; 
pulldown; select) whereas in 
rvATM, these behaviours 
correspond to both radar and 
FPSs. 
Analyse hand 
movements 
corresponding to Radar 
(highlight; pulldown; 
select) and to FPS 
(highlight; pulldown; 
select)  
Implemented as the 
flight strips are 
electronic and thus the 
corresponding hand 
movements in rATM 
for FPS (move, 
delete; write) do not 
apply here 
Warn users of the 
method that the 
physical 
architecture will 
change with 
changes in the 
simulation being 
analysed 
125 7.2.1.1 
whole 
section 
When forming the integrated 
model, the syntax for 
representing an intervention is 
difficult to apply, as FPSs in 
rvATM are not updated 
manually as in rATM so an 
intervention may have taken 
place and not been identified in 
the data  
Check protocol with 
electronic printout of 
the scenario, being 
analysed and construct a 
table identifying all 
interventions 
Solution 
implemented. Table 
of interventions 
constructed (see Table 
1 earlier) 
Possibly include in 
new version of 
TOPH for use when 
simulation uses 
electronic strips  
Table 4 Difficulties, experienced by the validator in the application of TOPH
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary aim of this paper is to report a successful 
case-study, which attempts to validate diagnostic design 
knowledge, both substantive and methodological, in the 
form of the TOPH theory, as applied to ATM, in the 
form of the rvATM simulation. The case-study is 
considered successful, inasmuch as rvATM, a more 
complex ATM simulation than rATM, is judged to fall 
within the scope of TOPH. The latter is, thus, 
considered to be partially validated, inasmuch as it was 
operationalised, tested and generalised (over rvATM). 
The validation, however, was only partial, because the 
validator experienced a number of difficulties in the 
application of TOPH, some of which needed the support 
of the case-study manager for their resolution. These 
difficulties can best be understood as design problems 
for TOPH and their solution constitutes a requirement 
for future research. A more effective version of TOPH 
would result. 
The secondary aim of the case-study is to identify 
general problems of applying design knowledge, 
derived from research. The main problem, encountered 
by the validator, was the very complexity of the 
diagnostic design knowledge itself. The complexity 
resided in: the rvATM simulation; the associated  
controllers’ interventions; the number and variety of 
models, required by the integrated model; and the 
reasoning, involved in applying the diagnosis method. 
The problem occurred, inspite of the details provided by 
TOPH (unusually fulsome for research) and the 
provision of methodological knowledge at all (most 
research omits how to apply frameworks, models, 
experimental results for design). The problem also 
occurred, despite the validator being a trained and 
experienced HCI researcher and the case-study 
manager, being involved in the development of TOPH. 
Initial reaction to this general problem of applying 
research prompts the following suggestions for its 
possible alleviation. First, researchers should be 
encouraged to include methodological knowledge. If 
Cognitive Ergonomics is about designing for 
effectiveness, which requires the identification and 
solution of design problems, then these latter practices 
need to be supported by research (Long and Dowell, 
1989; Dowell and Long, 1998). 
Second, a distinction might usefully be made between 
research reports for researchers and reports for the 
application of the knowledge by practitioners. Rather 
than thinking in terms of a dichotomy, between research 
and its application, we might better think in terms of a 
gradient, between research and practice. 
Last, this paper began with a critique of Cognitive 
Ergonomics researchers for not building on each other’s  
 
 
work (Newman, 1994; Long, 1996). It is hoped that the 
research, reported here, of a successful case-study, 
which partially validated design knowledge for ATM, 
suggests how this criticism may be met. 
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